The Civil Jury in the United States by Grenig, Jay E.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 92 Number 2 Article 2 
1-1-2017 
The Civil Jury in the United States 
Jay E. Grenig 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Grenig, Jay E. (2017) "The Civil Jury in the United States," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 92 : No. 2 , 
Article 2. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol92/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu. 
        
 
THE CIVIL JURY IN THE UNITED STATES 
JAY E. GRENIG* 
ABSTRACT 
 
This Article explores the evolution of the civil jury in the American 
judicial system.  The origins of the civil jury are functionally linked to 
ancient origins, and are a direct descendent from the English jury system.  
The civil jury system is both similar and distinct from the criminal jury 
system, with the civil jury system being an adapted form of the criminal 
system.  The Article explains the expansive and critical role the civil jury 
plays in the implementation and development of the law.  Important to this 
discussion is an understanding of where the jury began in the American 
system, and in what regard the role of a jury has been expanded and 
reduced in both civil and criminal disputes. 
Beyond a historical overview of the American civil jury system, this 
Article proposes possible improvements that can be made in regard to the 
civil jury system in America.  These improvements include the use of notes 
for juries, improved access to technology, special verdict forms, and other 
means. 
“The jury system puts a ban upon intelligence and honesty, and a 
premium upon ignorance, stupidity and perjury.”1 
 - Mark Twain 
“[S]o long as a case has to be scrutinised by twelve honest men, 
defendant and plaintiff alike have a safeguard from arbitrary perversion of 
the law.”2 
 - Winston Churchill 
 
 
 *  Jay E. Grenig, Professor of Law at Marquette University Law School. B.A. (1966), 
Willamette University; J.D. (1971), Hastings College of the Law, University of California.  Professor 
Grenig is the co-author with Kevin O’Malley and the Honorable William Lee of WEST’S FEDERAL JURY 
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS (6th ed.).  The section on jury instructions in this Article is adapted from 
that book. 
1. MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT (1872), http://www.twainquotes.com/Jury.html.  Dean 
Erwin Griswold would seem to agree with Mark Twain.  HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, 
THE AMERICAN JURY 5 (1966) (quoting 1962-63 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL DEAN’S REPORT 5-6: 
“Why should anyone think that 12 persons brought in from the street, selected in various ways, for 
their lack of general ability, should have any special capacity for deciding controversies between 
persons?”). 
2.  WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLES: THE BIRTH 
OF BRITAIN 176 (1956). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The exact origins of the jury trial are unknown and subject to 
considerable debate.3  Some have suggested that the jury has its roots in 
ancient Greece and the laws of Solon,4 the system of Judices found in the 
twelve tables of Roman law, imported during the Roman Conquest of 
England,5 the practices of the Anglo-Saxons,6 or in the judicial system 
imposed by the Normans following the Battle of Hastings in 1066.7 
Most civilizations, at one time or another, have permitted laypersons to 
decide disputes between litigants.8  However, many of these early so-called 
juries were not juries as we think of them in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence.  The Anglo-American jury consists of members of the 
community who are summoned to find the truth of disputed facts.  These 
jurors are distinct from judges or courts.9  While this Article examines the 
civil jury, consideration of the history of criminal juries is helpful because 
the modern civil jury descended from the old criminal jury through the 
action of trespass.10 
II. HISTORY OF THE JURY 
The jury system may have been brought to Rome by the Athenians and 
from there to England.11  It is believed that at least as of the time of the 
Magna Carta, the predecessor to the right to a jury trial existed in some 
fashion.12  This section examines the history of the “modern” jury in 
 
3.  Peter G. Keane, The Jury—Some Thoughts, Historical and Personal, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 
1249, 1249 (1996). 
4.  See RICHARDSON R. LYNN, JURY TRIAL LAW AND PRACTICE 2 (1986). 
5.  Id.; LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 3 (1973). 
6.  Forsyth asserts that trial by jury was unknown to the Anglo-Saxons. WILLIAM FORSYTH, 
HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 45 (2d ed. 1875).  He states that Anglo-Saxon jurors were no more 
than compurgators.  Id. at 15.  In a trial by compurgation or wager of law, the defendant took an 
oath of innocence and his “compurgators” would support him with an oath.  Commonly, the 
defendant had to produce eleven compurgators, which, with his own oath, made twelve.  See 
THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 115-16 (5th ed. 1956); 
JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 6 (1988). 
7.  Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 392 (1996); Keane, supra note 3, at 1249. 
8.  CHARLES W. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 39 (1962). 
9.  FORSYTH, supra note 6, at 7; but see PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 107 (quoting Maitland 
that “a jury is a body of neighbours summoned by a public officer to answer questions upon 
oath”).  While the jury is theoretically the fact finder, by ruling on the admissibility of evidence 
judges determine “which facts or alleged facts the jurors are allowed to hear.” GUINTHER, supra 
note 6, at 69-70. 
10.  PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 107. 
11.  See KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE 
& PROCEDURE, § 1:1, at 4 (6th ed. 2006). 
12.  See e.g., Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 279. 
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England and the United States beginning with the Norman conquest in 
1066. 
A. THE ENGLISH JURY 
The jury, as we know it, was likely unknown in England before the 
Norman conquest in 1066.13  The modern jury dates from 1154-1189, 
during the reign of King Henry II (“Henry II”).14  In the Twelfth Century, 
Henry II gave “litigants in the royal courts a startling new procedure—trial 
by jury.”15  “Although he did not invent the jury, [Henry II] put it to a new 
purpose.”16  Prior to Henry II, juries had been used by the Crown as an 
administrative device.17  The king had the right to summon a body of men 
to bear witness under oath about the truth of any question concerning the 
royal interest.18  Henry II, on the other hand, turned to regular use of the 
jury in the courts.19 
Because only the king had the right to summon a jury, Henry II 
restricted its use to those who sought justice before the royal judges, thus, 
strengthening royal power.20  The jury replaced decision through oath,21 
ordeal,22 or battle.23  While trial by jury quickly gained favor, it did not 
completely eliminate trial by ordeal.24 
 
13.  CHURCHILL, supra note 2, at 175; JOINER, supra note 8, at 39; but see MOORE, supra 
note 5, at 25-27 (suggesting that the jury originated with such Anglo-Saxon rulers as Aethelred I 
(866-871), Alfred the Great (871-899), and Aethelred II, the Unready (978-1013).  There is also 
an example of a jury trial in a boundary dispute during the reign of Edward the Confessor (1024-
1066)); see also Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated 
History, 44 HASTINGS. L.J. 579, 582 (1993) (important precursors to the jury existed in England 
before the Conquest and likely played a significant part in inducing Englishmen to place their trust 
in the jury trial mechanisms proffered by the conquerors).  On the other hand, Plucknett suggests 
that the tracking back of the jury to Anglo-Saxon institutions is motivated by idealised and 
patriotic reasons.  PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 108.  Forsyth asserts that Anglo-Saxon jurors 
“were nothing but compurgators.”  FORSYTH, supra note 6, at 15. 
14  CHURCHILL, supra note 2, at 175.  
15.  Id. at 217; see also MOORE, supra note 5, at 37-38; Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 
394. 
16.  CHURCHILL, supra note 2, at 175. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Trial by oath could be resorted to after a defendant’s testimony was challenged or 
contradicted by the plaintiff or accuser.  The defendant was required to repeat his denial under 
oath, according to an exact formula.  Oath was piled upon oath and the slightest deviation resulted 
in the defendant’s losing his case.  MOORE, supra note 5, at 28. 
22.  The ordeal was of three kinds: (1) the ordeal of hot iron, in which the accused took up 
and carried for a certain distance one pound of hot iron, (2) “the ordeal of hot water in which the 
accused had to take out of a pitcher of boiling water a stone hanging by a string at a depth equal to 
the length of his own hand,” and (3) the ordeal of the accursed morsel in which the accused person 
swallowed a piece of bread accompanied with a prayer that it might choke him if he were guilty.  
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There were various forms of the jury under Henry II.25  The two basic 
types of juries were presenting or accusing juries and trying juries.26  The 
accusing or presenting juries functioned in a manner similar to the modern 
grand jury and aided in the enforcement of criminal law.27  Members of the 
presenting jury were put under oath and required to reveal whether there 
was any person accused or publicly known as a robber, murderer, or other 
criminal in their community.28  The members of the jury presented to the 
judge the names of those suspected of crimes who were then taken at once 
to the ordeal of water.29 
Trying juries were used to decide civil disputes in assize30 cases, such 
as disputes over the possession or ownership of land.31  After the ordeal by 
water became less common,32 trying juries were used to try criminal cases 
after indictment by a presenting jury.33 
 
FORSYTH, supra note 6, at 67-68.  If the iron did not burn, the water scald, or the bread choke, it 
was a sign from Divine Providence that the accused was innocent.  CHURCHILL, supra note 2, at 
175; PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 113-14.  In another form of ordeal, trial by water, the accused 
was plunged in a body of water, if the accused did not drown, this was seen as a sign of innocence.  
CHURCHILL, supra note 2, at 175; see also PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 114. 
23.  CHURCHILL, supra note 2, at 218.  The trial by battle (sometimes referred to as the duel) 
was based on the theory that “the God of Battles will strengthen the arm of the righteous.”  Id.; see 
MOORE, supra note 5, at 4-5 (trial by battle was considered a nobler mode of trial, with trial by 
jury being reserved for “the weak, the aged and women”).  The prudent (including monasteries 
and other substantial landowners) took the precaution of “assisting the Almighty by retaining 
professional champions.”  CHURCHILL, supra note 2, at 175.  In civil cases, the battle was not 
fought between the parties themselves, but between their respective champions.  PLUCKNETT, 
supra note 6, at 116.  Trial by battle—at least in criminal appeals—existed in England until 1819. 
Id. at 117-18. 
24.  CHURCHILL, supra note 2, at 175. 
25.  Id. at 218-19. 
26.  GOLDWIN SMITH, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND 56 (2d ed. 1957).  At times the judges 
“merely inquired of the presenting jury whether the prisoner was guilty.”  PLUCKNETT, supra note 
6, at 120. 
27.  SMITH, supra note 26, at 56. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Id.  Ordeal by water could be either ordeal of hot water or ordeal of cold water.  The 
ordeal of hot water required the accused in a criminal case to dip his or her hand in a kettle of 
boiling water and retrieve a stone.  The hand was examined three days later to see whether it was 
healing or festering.  In the ordeal of hot water, the accused in a criminal case was thrown into a 
pond or river.  If the accused floated to the surface without any action of swimming, the accused 
was deemed guilty.  If the suspect sank, the suspect was pulled out and declared innocent.  See 
Trisha Olson, Of Enchantment: The Passing of the Ordeals and the Rise of the Jury Trial, 50 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 109, 118 (2000). 
30.  An “assize” was in the nature of a royal ordinance classifying judicial actions.  Id. at 57. 
31.  Id. 
32.  The decline in trial by ordeal has been traced back to 1215, the date of the fourth Lateran 
Council at Rome that prohibited priests from taking further part in ordeals.  SMITH, supra note 26, 
at 58. 
33.  Id. at 59.  Because all the property of a person convicted by a jury was forfeited to the 
king, many refused to submit to the jury.  Id.  To persuade persons to consent to be tried by jury, 
weights and stones were loaded on them and they were frequently given no food.  Id.  Many died 
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All forms of juries under Henry II had one essential characteristic—the 
jurors were both witness and judges as to facts.34  The jurors returned a 
verdict based on what they knew, what they were told before trial, and what 
they were told during trial.35  Jurors were not picked for their impartiality, 
but instead, because they were the men most likely to know the truth.36  The 
modern jury that knows nothing about the case until it is proved in court 
was still to come.37  By the mid-1500s, in almost all cases, there was a 
complete separation of witnesses from the jury.38 
To avoid delay and expense, the parties might agree on a jury de 
circumstantibus—a jury of bystanders.39  The few jurors who knew the 
truth of the matter would tell their tale to the bystanders, and then everyone 
on the jury would deliver their verdict.40 
In time, the jurors with local knowledge would cease to be jurors at all 
and become witnesses, giving their evidence in open court to a jury entirely 
composed of bystanders.41  However, the old ideas did not pass quietly.  
Even under the Tudor kings,42 jurors might be tried for perjury if they gave 
a wrongful verdict.43  Later, judges fined and imprisoned juries that 
returned verdicts the judges thought to be incorrect.44 
The practice of punishing juries for incorrect verdicts ended in 1670 in 
the Bushell’s Case.45  When the jurors refused to find William Penn guilty 
 
of this treatment, called peine forte et dure, but, because they died not having been convicted of 
any crime, their families inherited their property.  Id. 
34.  CHURCHILL, supra note 2, at 219; see Keane, supra note 3, at 1251 (the early jury was a 
group of neighbors who came together and pooled their collective knowledge about a dispute to 
reach an agreement on the proper resolution); Roger W. Kirst, The Jury’s Historic Domain in 
Complex Cases, 58 WASH. L. REV. 1, 14 (1982) (body that eventually became the jury began as a 
group of local residents who knew at least some of the facts of the dispute before the trial); see 
also DONALD K. ROSS, THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM: AN ESSENTIAL OF JUSTICE 16 (1971) (jurors 
are chosen for their open minds; their newness to the situation leaves them open to legitimate 
persuasion). 
35.  Kirst, supra note 34, at 14; see MOORE, supra note 5, at 37 (it was usual for jurors to 
inform themselves about the dispute before appearing in court). 
36.  CHURCHILL, supra note 2, at 176. 
37.  Id. 
38.  Landsman, supra note 13, at 586. 
39.  CHURCHILL, supra note 2, at 176. 
40.  Id.  
41.  Id.; LYNN, supra note 4, at 2. 
42.  Circa 1485-1603.  See House of Tudor, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/House-of-Tudor (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).  
43.  CHURCHILL, supra note 2, at 176; see LYNN, supra note 4, at 2 n.10 (“If the judge 
thought that the jury verdict was erroneous, jurors were subject to attaint, a procedure in which 
the parties and original jury were tried by a larger jury. If the attaint jury returned a different 
verdict, the first jury was convicted and punished for perjury.”). 
44.  LYNN, supra note 4, at 2. 
45.  1 Vaug. 135 (1670), reprinted in 124 ENG. REPT. 1006 (1912).  See LYNN, supra note 4, 
at 3; see also MOORE, supra note 5, at 83-86; PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 134; GODFREY D. 
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of holding an illegal Quaker meeting in London, the jurors were fined and 
imprisoned until they could pay the fine.46  Bushell, the foreman of the jury, 
obtained a writ of habeas corpus from Justice Vaughan.47  Justice 
Vaughan’s opinion established the principle that jurors have the right to 
give their verdict according to their convictions.48  Of course, the common 
law form of pleadings narrowed the issues in dispute so that English juries 
were frequently faced with only a few points.49 
From 1190 until 1870, English law recognized the danger in allowing 
members of a minority community to be tried entirely by majority jurors.50  
In cases involving minorities, juries were impaneled consisting half of 
natives and half of foreigners.51  Such a jury was referred to as a jury de 
medietate linguae.52  The right to a jury de medietate linguae was available 
in America for aliens involved in legal proceedings at least between 1647 
and 1911.53 
The concept of the mixed jury originated in the treatment of Jews in 
medieval England.54  The English viewed the Jews as aliens in race, 
religion, and culture because they were darker-skinned and spoke a 
mysterious and foreign language.55  Separate Jewish tribunals were used to 
settle civil disputes between Jews.56  When a Jew was involved in a dispute 
with a Christian, the king had a substantial financial interest because, if the 
Christian prevailed, the property that would otherwise belong to a Jew (and 
thereby to the king, because Jews were viewed as the king’s property) 
would be lost to the king.57  In 1190, there were mass riots and violence 
 
LEHMAN, WE THE JURY: THE IMPACT OF JURORS ON OUR BASIC FREEDOMS 35-72 (1997); 
GUINTHER, supra note 6, at 1, 24-27 (examining descriptions of the proceedings in Bushell.).  
Bushell is spelled “Bushel” in several sources.  See, e.g., PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 134; 
GUINTHER, supra note 6, at 1, 24-27.  However, 1 Vaug. 135, the original source, spells it 
“Bushell.” 
46.  MOORE, supra note 5, at 86. 
47.  Id.  
48.  Id.  
49.  See FORSYTH, supra note 6, at 147. 
50.  Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury de 
Medietate Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777, 781 (1994). 
51.  Id. at 791; see also Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 404. 
52.  Ramirez, supra note 50, at 791; see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 430 (6th ed. 1990), 
defining medietate linguae to mean “of the half tongue.” 
53.  Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 437 (In 1682, Puritans in the Plymouth Colony added 
Native Americans to the jury in a criminal case relating to a Native American.). 
54.  Ramirez, supra note 50, at 783.  Forsyth states that the first mention of the jury de 
medietate linguae is in the reign of Edward I.  FORSYTH, supra note 6, at 189.  
55.  Ramirez, supra note 50, at 783. 
56.  Id. at 784. 
57.  Id. 
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against Jews.58  To protect his own property, King Richard I enacted a 
charter that gave Jews, when suing Christians, the right to a half-Jewish 
jury.59 
With the expulsion of the Jews in 1290, foreign merchants from Italy 
and Germany became the financial agents of the king.60  In 1303, King 
Edward I provided by charter that foreign merchants living in England 
should, in all cases in which they were involved, except capital cases, be 
entitled to a jury trial consisting of six foreign merchants residing in the city 
or town and six other good and lawful men of the place where the trial was 
to be held.61  In 1353, the statute was reaffirmed with the additional 
provision that, when both merchants were foreign, the jury would be 
entirely foreign.62 
When this protection was abrogated during the reign of Henry V,63 
foreign merchants responded by refusing to do business in England.64  As a 
result, in 1429, a new statue was passed reaffirming the right of all aliens to 
a jury de medietate linguae.65  The Naturalization Act of 1870 abolished an 
alien’s right to a mixed jury, although Parliament permitted aliens to serve 
on juries.66 
In 1933, Parliament passed an act67 having the effect of requiring the 
virtual elimination of civil jury trials.68  Since about 1939, the great 
majority of civil cases have been tried without a jury.69 
B. THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN JURY 
The right to trial by jury is a fundamental and favored aspect of 
American jurisprudence.70  “Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body 
is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and 
jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should 
 
58.  Id.  
59.  Id.  
60.  Id.  
61.  MOORE, supra note 5, at 58; FORSYTH, supra note 6, at 190. 
62.  MOORE, supra note 5, at 58; FORSYTH, supra note 6, at 190. 
63.  Circa 1414.  See Henry V, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/ 
biography/Henry-V-king-of-England (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).  
64.  Ramirez, supra note 50, at 785. 
65.  Id. at 786. 
66.  Id.  
67.  MOORE, supra note 5, at 128 (citing The Statutes Revised, 1933, ch. 36). 
68.  See ROSS, supra note 34, at 7; GUINTHER, supra note 6, at 34. 
69.  MOORE, supra note 5, at 129. 
70.  See 1 O’MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE, supra note 11, § 7:6.  
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be scrutinized with the utmost care.”71  This section examines the historical 
bases of American juries. 
1.  Early American Juries 
Jury trials came to America with English colonists.72  The Virginia 
Charter of 1606, providing that the colonists would maintain all the rights 
of the English, has been read as guaranteeing the right to a jury trial.73  The 
Massachusetts Bay Colony was the first of the American colonies to 
introduce the jury trial in 1628.74 
In 1765, the First Congress of the American Colonies75 adopted a 
resolution declaring “[t]hat trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right 
of every British subject of these colonies.”76  The First Continental 
Congress, in 1774, declared that “the respective colonies are entitled to the 
common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable 
privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the 
course of that law.”77  The Declaration of Independence criticized the 
“English practice of transporting colonists accused of treason to England 
for trial. . .” and also accused King George of depriving them of “the 
benefit of being known by those who prosecuted and tried [them]. . . .”78 
2. The Seventh Amendment 
Although Article III of the U.S. Constitution guarantees a right to a 
jury trial in criminal cases, the Constitution did not originally contain a 
correlative right in civil cases.79  During the Constitutional Convention, 
 
71.  Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935). 
72.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152 (1968). 
73.  See Landsman, supra note 13, at 592. 
74.  Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 422 n. 174 (listing the dates for the commencement 
of the right to jury trials in the various colonies); see also Landsman, supra note 13, at 592. 
75.  The First Congress was also referred to as the “Stamp Act Congress.”  It consisted of 
nine colonies.  Michael H. Glasser, Comment, Letting the Supermajority Rule: Nonunanimous 
Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 662 n.24 (1997). 
76.  1 O’MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 6 (6th ed. 2006) (citing Duncan, 
391 U.S. at 152). 
77.  Duncan, 391 U.S. at 152 (quoting SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY 
ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 
270, 288 (Richard Perry, ed., 1959)).  See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief 
History of Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 871 (1994) (“The framers’ 
enthusiastic support for the jury stemmed in large measure from the role that juries had played in 
resisting English authority before the Revolution.”). 
78.  Kenneth B. Nunn, When Juries Meet the Press: Rethinking the Jury’s Representative 
Function in Highly Publicized Cases, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 405, 412-13 (1995). 
79.  1 O’MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 6-7; LYNN, supra note 4, at 7. 
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nothing was said about the right to a civil jury trial until the final week.80  
On September 1, 1787, Delegate Hugh Williamson observed that no 
provision was yet made for juries in civil cases.81  Another delegate 
opposed the inclusion of a provision for civil juries, observing that it was 
not possible to differentiate equity cases from those in which juries are 
proper.82  That delegate was also concerned that the constitution of juries 
varied across different states.83  After a discussion, the delegates decided 
not to include a right to a jury trial in civil cases.84 
Some have suggested that claims about drafting difficulty was 
disingenuous.85  Instead, they contend there was a growing belief that the 
jury should play only a modest part in the governance of post-revolutionary 
America.86  The absence of a guarantee of civil jury trials became one of the 
principal arguments against ratification of the Constitution.87  “At least 
seven of the states ratifying the Constitution called for [an] immediate 
amendment to secure the right to jury trial in civil cases.”88  The lack of a 
guarantee to a civil jury trial “was a chief impetus in the push for a Bill of 
Rights.”89 
“The Seventh Amendment became effective in 1791 after its 
ratification by Virginia.”90  It has been suggested that “the best reading of 
the [Jury Trial Clause] is probably . . . if a state court entertaining a given 
common-law case would use a civil jury, a federal court hearing the same 
case . . . must follow—must ‘preserve’—that state-law jury right.”91  “The 
forum state’s law is to determine what constitutes a “common law case” for 
 
80.  Stanton D. Krauss, The Original Understanding of the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury 
Trial, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 407, 410 (1999). 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. (quoting JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, 616-30 (Adrienne Koch, ed., 1987)). 
83.  Id. at 411. 
84.  Id.  
85.  Landsman, supra note 13, at 598. 
86.  Id.  Among the apparent concerns was the perception that jury decisions were frequently 
anti-creditor.  
87.  Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830); Eric Grant, A Revolutionary View of the 
Seventh Amendment and the Just Compensation Clause, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 144, 157 (1996). 
88.  Landsman, supra note 13, at 600. 
89.  LYNN, supra note 4, at 7. 
90.  Id.  The Seventh Amendment provides: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, 
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of 
the common law.   
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
91.  Krauss, supra note 80, at 408. 
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these purposes.”92  Because the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the 
states,93 there is no constitutional requirement that states provide for juries 
in civil cases.94 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the intent of the 
creators was to preserve the right of jury trial that existed under the English 
common law when the Seventh Amendment was adopted.95  The Court has 
taken this to mean that there can be no right to jury trial under the Seventh 
Amendment unless “we are dealing with a cause of action that either was 
tried at law at the time of the founding or is at least analogous to one that 
was.”96 
Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of the right to a 
jury trial is guided by historical analysis comprising two principal inquiries.  
The Court first asks whether it is “dealing with a cause of action that either 
was tried at law at the time of the founding or is at least analogous to one 
that was.”97  Next, the Court asks “whether the particular trial decision must 
fall to the jury to preserve the substance of the common law right.”98  Put 
another way, the law-equity test99 defines whether a jury is available and 
the judge-jury test100 defines the role of the jury if one is available.101 
3. The American Jury as Judge of Legal and Factual Questions—
Verdicts of Conscience 
It has been said that juries are supposed to take the law from the judge, 
who gives the law in the form of instructions.102  Nullification occurs when 
the jury deliberately ignores the jury instructions.103  It is practically 
 
92.  Id. 
93.  Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836, 836 (1973). 
94.  City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 719 (1999); 
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974). 
95.  Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. at 708 (“‘[S]uits at common law’ include 
not merely suits that the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but [also] 
suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those 
where equitable rights alone were recognized and equitable remedies were administered.”). 
96.  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996). 
97.  Id.; Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. at 708; but see Landsman, supra note 
13, at 579 (criticizing the courts’ “simplistic historical test that turns on whether a challenged jury 
regulation was part of English common law practice in 1791”). 
98.  Markman, 517 U.S. at 376. 
99.  See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
100.  See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
101.  Markman, 517 U.S. at 377; see Kirst, supra note 34, at 12.  
102.  See California v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 726 (1983). 
103.  Id. at 730 (Kingsley, J., concurring); see Kirst, supra note 34, at 10-12 for a discussion 
of jury nullification; GUINTHER, supra note 6, at 220 (noting that the term “conscience verdict” 
may be a more apt description). 
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impossible to detect or control jury nullification when a general verdict is 
rendered.104 
The 1735 trial of John Peter Zenger,105 cases involving Vietnam anti-
war protestors,106 and cases involving anti-abortion protestors107 could be 
examples of jury nullification.108  While proponents of jury nullification 
sometimes characterize it as a means of preventing political oppression,109 
at times, jury nullification itself has shocked the conscience.110  One jury 
nullification advocacy group estimates that three to four percent of all jury 
trials involve nullification.111 
The jury in Norman England did not have the power to actually decide 
questions of law.112  As a general rule, “juries in England possessed the 
power to judge issues of fact, but not of law.”113  It was thought that 
certainty in the law was better achieved by leaving legal questions to the 
judge.  However, “English juries could and did disregard the instructions of 
judges, though they had no official authority to do so.”114 
 
104.  Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 416; PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 125 (noting that a 
jury was considered as no more rational “than the ordeals which it replaced, and just as one did 
not question the judgments of God as shown by the ordeal, so the verdict of a jury was equally 
inscrutable.”); see FED. R. CIV. P. 50 (noting in civil cases, unlike criminal cases, the judge has 
considerable power to review the jury’s verdict). 
105.  See, e.g., LEHMAN, supra note 45, at 152-74 (explaining that the jury acquitted Zenger, 
who was defended by the foremost lawyer in the colonies, Andrew Hamilton, of criminally 
libeling the Royal Governor of New York. Hamilton urged the jury to disobey the instructions of 
the court and to determine for themselves whether the laws of England made it a crime to punish 
truthful criticism of government); ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL 
OF DEMOCRACY 75 (1994) (noting that “the acquittal rested on a principled claim about freedom 
of the press and the right to print truthful criticism of government”). 
106.  GUINTHER, supra note 6, at 222-23; but see United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 
519 (9th Cir. 1972) (court upheld district’s court’s refusal to instruct jurors that they could acquit 
the defendant regardless of whether he had violated the law, because the jurors already knew they 
could return a conscience verdict without an instruction); compare United States v. Anderson, 356 
F. Supp. 1311 (D.N.J. 1973); Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of 
a Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 53 (1980) (noting that the jury were instructed 
that “if you find that the overreaching participation by Government agents or informers in the 
activities as you have heard them here was so fundamentally unfair to be offensive to the basic 
standards of decency, and shocking to the universal sense of justice, then you may acquit. . . .”). 
107.  See ABRAMSON, supra note 105, at 57-59. 
108.  GUINTHER, supra note 6, at 222-23. 
109.  LYNN, supra note 4, at 3. 
110.  ABRAMSON, supra note 105, at 61-62 (explaining that in the 1950s and 1960s all-white 
juries repeatedly acquitted murderers of African-Americans despite overwhelming evidence). 
111.  Clay S. Conrad, Doing Your Best as a Trial Juror: Surviving Voir Dire, FULLY 
INFORMED JURY ASS’N, http://fija.org/docs/BR_YYYY_surviving_voir_dire.pdf (last visited Mar. 
18, 2017).  
112.  MOORE, supra note 5, at 40. 
113.  Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 415. 
114.  Id.; Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 77, at 903. 
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The jury in the colonial legal system decided “legal as well as factual 
questions because of the fear that courts would become instruments of 
political oppression.”115  “In America, following the Revolution, however, 
the authority of American juries to resolve legal issues was frequently 
confirmed by constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions.”116  “In some 
colonies, American judges did not always give jury instructions.”117  But 
where instructions were given, the jury was bound to follow them.118  “In 
the early Nineteenth Century, judges [orally] explained the law to 
jurors.”119 
At one point, early in the 1770s, John Adams wrote that juries should 
follow the judge’s explanation of the law, except in cases involving 
“fundamental principles” of liberty, in which it was not only the juror’s 
“right, but his duty . . . to find the verdict according to his own best 
understanding, judgment, and conscience, though in direct opposition to the 
direction of the court.”120  Less than thirty years later, when he was 
President of the United States, Adams was instrumental in securing the 
enactment of the repressive Alien and Sedition Laws.121  However, even 
those laws expressly provided that the jury has “a right to determine the law 
and the fact . . . as in other cases.”122  When juries refused to convict, the 
Alien and Sedition Laws became unenforceable.123 
In the Eighteenth Century, Massachusetts juries were traditionally free 
to “disregard judicial instructions concerning the law and to return general 
verdicts conflicting with established doctrine.”124  This would seem to be 
consistent with the authority American juries were often granted to resolve 
issues of law as well as fact.125  The power of juries to decide questions of 
 
115.  LYNN, supra note 4, at 3; see ABRAMSON, supra note 105, at 73-75; but see SAMUEL 
ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 200-01 (1965) (British 
soldiers accused of Murder in the “Boston Massacre” and defended by John Adams were 
acquitted of murder by the colonial jury). 
116.  Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 77, at 903 (stating that, in the pre-Revolution Zenger 
trial, Andrew Hamilton declared that juries “have the right to . . . determine both the law and the 
fact.”).  
117.  Id. at 904; Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 441. 
118.  Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 442. 
119.  Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Notes on the Civil Jury in Historical Perspective, 48 
DEPAUL L. REV. 201, 206 (1998) (emphasis added). 
120.  GUINTHER, supra note 6, at 221 (citing JOHN ADAMS, WORKS 253-55 (1850) 
(emphasis added); see ABRAMSON, supra note 105, at 23-24, 30-31 (describing jury nullification 
in Massachusetts). 
121.  Id. 
122.  Ch. 75, 1 Stat. 597 (1798). 
123.  GUINTHER, supra note 6, at 221. 
124.  Landsman, supra note 13, at 602. 
125.  Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 447; see, e.g., Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1 (1794) 
(In which Chief Justice Jay, in one of the few jury trials before the Supreme Court, instructed the 
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law was curtailed in federal courts, in 1895, when the Supreme Court held 
that in federal courts “it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the 
law from the court.”126  The constitutions of several states127 still provide 
that jurors shall judge questions of law as well as questions of fact, although 
judicial decisions have virtually eliminated this power.128 
“The continuing viability of jury nullification is the subject of some 
debate.”129  In 1895, the Supreme Court rejected the right of criminal juries 
to judge the law.130  Jury instructions in California, for example, inform 
jurors that it is their “duty to follow the law” and that they must apply the 
law of the case.131  Nonetheless, whether obvious or hidden, nullification is 
a timely strategy that jurors use to bring the law into line with their 
consciences and will probably exist as long as we have juries.132 
C. A JURY OF TWELVE 
Swedish mythology says, “Odin ordained twelve Asagods to adjudge 
all causes in the metropolis of Asgard.”133  Scandinavian juries were 
traditionally composed of twelve jurors, although the Norwegian assembly 
of the people had thirty-six.134  Even the Russians used a jury of twelve men 
in certain criminal cases.135  In Scania, the jury started with fifteen 
 
jury that the courts are the best judges of the law, but that the jury nevertheless had a right to 
determine the law as well as the fact in controversy.). 
126.  Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895) (a criminal case). 
127.  Georgia, Indiana, and Maryland. 
128.  Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 453. 
129.  Compare ABRAMSON, supra note 105, at 85-95 (describing the decline of jury 
nullification), with LEHMAN, supra note 45, at 352-53 (asserting that “the jury has an 
‘unreviewable and irreversible power. . . to acquit in disregard of the instruction on the law’”); see 
1 O’MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE, supra note 11, § 5.16 (“[a]lthough the jury has the power to nullify, 
it is not a right of the defendant”). 
130.  Sparf, 156 U.S. at 185; but see Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156 (Justice White appeared to 
support conscience verdicts when he wrote that a jury is an “inestimable safeguard against the 
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. . . . The 
deep commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial . . . as a defense against arbitrary law 
enforcement qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and must therefore be respected by the States.”); see also Local 36 Int’l Fishermen & Allied 
Workers of America v. United States, 177 F.2d 320, 339 (1979) (“The jury has always exercised 
the pardoning power, notwithstanding the law, which is their actual prerogative.”). 
131.  CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL BAJI 1.00 (2007 rev.); see Noll v. Lee, 34 
Cal.Rptr. 223, 227 (1963) (explaining that jurors are “bound by the law as given them by the 
court”). 
132.  ABRAMSON, supra note 105, at 95. 
133.  MOORE, supra note 5, at 4. 
134.  Id. at 5. 
135.  Id. at 8 (suggesting that this tribunal may be derived from Scandinavian sources). 
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nominated men, and the defendant could challenge three of the fifteen 
men.136 
Many distinguished authorities trace the modern day jury back to the 
Franks.137  For example, author William Forsyth states that in the jury’s 
infancy in England, the number of jurors seems to have fluctuated with 
convenience or local custom requirements.138  Lord Devlin, a British jurist, 
suggests that, because twelve was the number traditionally used in the 
wager of law or compurgation,139 twelve is the customary number of jurors 
on a jury.140  Through the reign of King John, however, twelve was not 
invariably the number of jurors.141  A 1682 guide to jurors indicates that 
juries are twelve by analogy to the Prophets the Apostles, the Discoverers, 
and the Stones.142 
It appears to have been well-established in America that a jury is 
composed of twelve jurors.143  For example, juries in colonial Virginia 
courts were generally composed of twelve men, although records show that 
some were composed of thirteen, fourteen, or twenty-four men.144  
However, a 1645 Connecticut regulation authorized judges to impanel 
either six or twelve-person juries.145  And in Massachusetts, when twelve 
persons were not available, juries of six were allowed in certain civil 
cases.146 
Until the 1970s, it was assumed that trial by jury required the 
unanimous verdict of twelve jurors.147  In 1970, the Supreme Court 
 
136.  FORSYTH, supra note 6, at 24. 
137.  PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 109 (citing H. Brunner, Entstehung der Schwurgerichte 
(1872) and C.H. Haskins, Norman Institutions (1918)). 
138.  FORSYTH, supra note 6, at 108. 
139.  See PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 115-16. 
140.  MOORE, supra note 5, at 41 (citing SIR PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 159 (1966)). 
141.  Id. (stating that numbers of jurors ranging from six to sixty-six have been found).  At 
least one trying jury consisted of eighty-four persons.  PLUCKNETT, supra note 6, at 120. 
142.  MOORE, supra note 5, at 41; see also I COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTE OF 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 155a (1823) (“And it seemeth to 
me, that the law in this case delighteth herselfe in the number of 12; for there must not onely be 12 
jurors for the tryall of matters of fact, but 12 judges of ancient time for tryall of matters of law in 
the Exchequer Chamber.  Also for matters of state there were in ancient time twelve Counsellors 
of State.  He that wageth his law must have eleven others with him, which thinke he says true.  
And that number of twelve is much respected in holy writ, as 12 apostles, 12 stones, 12 tribes, 
etc.”). 
143.  Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 426. 
144.  Harold M. Hyman & Catherine M. Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial Jury History, in 
4 THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 23, 26 (1975). 
145.  Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 428. 
146.  Id. 
147.  LYNN, supra note 4, at 3; see Landsman, supra note 13, at 586 (in mid-fourteenth 
century England, jury verdicts were required to be unanimous). 
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approved verdicts by six-person, unanimous juries.148  The “empirical 
studies” relied upon by the Supreme Court in these decisions have been 
criticized by some scholars.149 
III.  IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIAL BY JURY 
“The jury will continue to be an essential part of the American system 
of justice for the foreseeable future.”150  Nonetheless, there are a number of 
steps that can be taken “to increase juror understanding and the 
effectiveness of the jury system.”151  This section suggests possible steps 
that can be taken to improve the effectiveness of trial by jury.152 
A. “JUROR NOTEBOOKS”153 
In appropriate cases, judges should distribute[,] or permit the 
parties to distribute[, to each juror notebooks containing] the 
court’s preliminary instructions, selected exhibits that [have been] 
ruled admissible, stipulations, and other material not subject to 
dispute such as photographs, curricula vitae of experts, glossaries, 
and chronologies.154  [T]he court should require jurors to sign their 
notebooks and . . . should collect them at the end of each day of 
trial until the jurors retire to deliberate.155 
The notebooks can be returned to the jurors when they resume further 
deliberations, if any. 
 
148.  Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970) (state may constitutionally use a jury of six 
members in a criminal case); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 152 (1973) (extending the holding 
of Williams v. Florida to civil cases and upholding a local rule authorizing a six-member jury in 
civil cases); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 48 (“The court shall seat a jury of not fewer than six and not 
more than twelve members and all members shall participate in the verdict unless excused from 
service by the court pursuant to Rule 47(c).”). 
149.  See DAVID A. VOLLRATH & JAMES H. DAVIS, Jury Size and Decision Role, in THE 
JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 73, 74-77 (Rita J. Simon, ed., 1980); see, Richard S. 
Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1, 34 (1993) (“I would remind you that efficiency, although it is a value, is not the only value 
that we expect out of our government.  In fact, the Framers deliberately constructed a system that 
would not be completely efficient.  They did not trust government, and the jury is one of the 
institutions designed to put a check on it.”). 
150.  Jay E. Grenig, The Civil Jury in America: Improving the Jury’s Understanding of a 
Case, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 93, 93 (2000) [hereinafter Grenig’s Civil Jury]. 
151.  Id. (citing 4 KEVIN O’MALLEY, JAY GRENIG & WILLIAM LEE, FEDERAL JURY 
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 100.01 (5th ed. 2000)). 
152.  Id. 
153.  Id.  
154.  Id. at 93-94 (citing A.B.A., CIV. TRIAL PRAC. §§ 3-4 (1998) [hereinafter ABA]; 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIG. §§ 22.32, 22.42 (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter Manual]). 
155.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra, note 150, at 94 (citing ABA, supra note 154, § 3). 
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B. “PRELIMINARY AND INTERIM INSTRUCTIONS”156 
A court should give the jury preliminary instructions at the beginning 
of the trial, describing “the jury’s role, explain[ing] trial procedures, 
set[ting] forth the issues in dispute, and include the relevant basic legal 
principles.157  In addition, courts should consider giving interim instructions 
in complex or lengthy cases to improve juror understanding of the evidence 
during the trial.”158  Properly used, these instructions will assist the jurors in 
understanding the case. 
C. “SPECIAL VERDICT FORMS”159 
“Judges should consider using special verdict forms tailored to the 
issues in cases of appropriate complexity.”160  Each juror should be 
provided with “a copy of the form for use during deliberations.”161  
“[W]here it will assist the jurors, . . . a copy of the verdict form [should be 
given] to each juror during closing arguments and final instructions.”162 
D. “JUROR QUESTIONS”163 
Where “it will assist the jury to understand the evidence” or to 
“determin[e] a fact in issue,” “jurors should be allowed to submit written 
questions for witnesses.”164  However, jurors should be cautioned that 
 
156.  Id. 
157  Id. at 94 (citing ABA, supra note 154, § 15; SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. 
WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 144 (1988) 
(urging the use of preliminary instructions in order to provide jurors with a legal framework 
before they hear the evidence and arguments); William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132 
F.R.D. 575, 583-84 (1990)).  See GUINTHER, supra note 6, at 70-74 for a discussion of the history 
of judges instructing juries. 
158.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra, note 150, at 94 (citing Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 
479).  It may be impossible to draft jury instructions that will satisfy everyone.  See, e.g., Kassin 
& WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 157, at 141 (claiming that the attorney for Erin Fleming in a law suit 
involving the estate of Groucho Marx asked the jury to throw out the verdict because the jury had 
failed to understand the meaning of “love.”).  
159.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra, note 150, at 94. 
160.  Id. (citing Walker v. N. M. & S. Pac. Rail Co., 165 U.S. 593 (1897) (approving use of 
special verdicts); ABA, supra note 154, § 20; FORSYTH, supra note 6, at 248 (indicating that when 
trial by jury in civil cases was introduced into Scotland in 1815 it became necessary to frame 
distinct issues in the shape of questions to be submitted to the jury); Douglas G. Smith, supra note 
7, at 485); see FED. R. CIV. P. 49.  
161.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra, note 150, at 94 (citing ABA, supra note 154, § 20). 
162.  Id. at 94-95. 
163.  Id. at 95. 
164.  Id. (citing United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that 
there is nothing improper about allowing jurors to ask questions to be answered by witnesses); 
ABA, supra note 154, § 9; GUINTHER, supra note 6, at 68 (questioning the accuracy of the phrase 
jury nullification); 1 O’MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE, supra note 11, § 5.18; 4 O’MALLEY, GRENIG & 
LEE, supra note 151, § 101.15; Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 
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questions are to be reserved “for important points only.”165  It should be 
explained that “the sole purpose of [the] questions is to clarify testimony” 
and that jurors are not to argue with witnesses.166  “The court should also 
[tell] the jurors that [there are some questions that] will not be asked and 
[that jurors] are to draw no inference” if a question is not asked.167  It may 
even “be proper to allow jurors to question the judge concerning the law 
and legal instructions they are to apply to the facts.”168 
E. “JUROR NOTE TAKING”169 
Jurors should be allowed to take notes for use in their deliberations.170 
Note taking may aid in juror recollection of the evidence and focus 
the jurors’ attention on the trial proceedings.  Prior to permitting 
jurors to take notes, the court should give an appropriate 
cautionary instruction to the jury.  The court should collect all 
juror notes at the end of each trial day until the jury retires to 
deliberate[, and then] all juror notes [should be collected and 
destroyed] at the end of the trial. . . .171 
F. “USE OF MASTERS”172 
The task of jurors may be made easier in complicated cases by the use 
of “court-appointed masters” “to provid[e] the jury with simple language 
interpretations of the facts.”173  “The master’s findings [upon the issues 
submitted] are admissible as evidence of the matters found and may be read 
 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1185 (1995); Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Increasing Juror 
Participation Through Note Taking and Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256, 259-61 (1996); 
Steven D. Penrod & Larry Heuer, Tweaking Commonsense: Assessing Aids to Jury Decision 
Making, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 259, 271-80 (1997); Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 
496-97).  
165.  Id. (quoting ABA, supra note 154, § 9). 
166.  Id. (citing ABA, supra note 154, § 9). 
167.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra, note 150, at 95 (citing ABA, supra note 154, § 9). 
168.  Id. (citing Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 498). 
169.  Id. 
170.  Id. (citing ABA, supra note 154, § 6; MANUAL, supra note 154, §§ 22.42, 41.63; Heuer 
& Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation Through Note Taking and Question Asking, supra note 
164, at 258-59; Penrod & Heuer, Tweaking Commonsense: Assessing Aids to Jury Decision 
Making, supra note 164, at 263-71; Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 500; see also GUINTHER, 
supra note 6, at 68-69; see 1 O’MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE, supra note 11, §§ 5.11, 10.03, 10.04; 4 
O’MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE, supra note 151, §§ 101.13, 101.14). 
171.  Id. at 96 (citing ABA, supra note 154, §§ 6, 7). 
172.  Id. 
173.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra, note 150, at 96 (citing GUINTHER, supra note 6, at 215; see 
generally FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (allowing the court to appoint a special master); 4 JAY E. GRENIG, 
WEST’S FEDERAL FORMS: DISTRICT COURT (CIVIL) §§ 4361, 4381 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing the 
role of court appointed masters)). 
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to the jury, subject to the ruling of the court upon any objections.”174  
However, in some cases, “the master’s report may confuse rather than ease 
the jurors’ job” as the report provides the jurors with more information to 
be considered.175 
G. “COURTROOM TECHNOLOGY”176 
[Jurors are accustomed to living with technology,] including 
videotape and computers.177  All too often, courtroom technology 
is limited to microphones and, in some cases, videotape.178  
[C]ourts should be receptive to the use of technology in the 
presentation of evidence.179  [M]any exhibits, including 
photographs and documents, such as medical records and x-rays, 
[can be presented using computer technology] far more effectively 
than old-fashioned methods.180  Computer animation aids 
perception.181  [CD-ROMs can be used to] store and retrieve audio 
and video information.182  Technology can aid the analysis and 
interpretation of facts [as well as] foster visual perception.183 
H. “JURY SELECTION”184 
Attention should be given to increasing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of jury voir dire.185  In the trial of the British soldiers 
accused of murder, following the so-called “Boston Massacre,” the 
twelve jurors were picked in one morning, although Boston was 
 
174.  Id. at 96 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 53(e)(3)). 
175  Id. (citing GUINTHER, supra note 6, at 215). 
176.  Id.  
177  Id. (citing MANUAL, supra note 154, § 34.1, at 394). 
178.  Id. 
179  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 96 (citing ABA, supra note 154, at 54; 
MANUAL, supra note 154, §§ 34.1-34.4). 
180.  Id. at 96-97. 
181.  Id. at 97.  
182.  Id. 
183.  Id. at 97 (citing MANUAL, supra note 154, § 34.1) 
184.  Id. 
185  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra, note 150, at 97 (citing 1 O’MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE, supra 
note 11, § 4.07, at 129; see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2482, at 113 (1995) (stating that, unfortunately, counsel too 
often regard voir dire as an opportunity to obtain a jury sympathetic to their position)); Robert J. 
Hirsch et al., Attorney Voir Dire and Arizona’s Jury Reform Package, ARIZ. ATTY. 24 (Apr. 
1996). 
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then a center of anti-British sentiment.186  Today, voir dire can 
take far longer.187 
The trial judge should [be permitted to] conduct an initial voir dire 
examination [before] questions by counsel for a reasonable period 
of time.188  No matter how the voir dire examination is conducted, 
[its purpose] is not to make an advance favorable portrayal of the 
case of one side or the other, but rather to ensure the parties a trial 
by an impartial jury.189 
The search for impartial jurors should not result in the “elimination 
of all persons who are normally attentive to and knowledgeable 
about the happenings around them.”190  Impartiality should not be 
confused with ignorance.  A predisposition against considering the 
facts, not pretrial information, undermines impartiality.191 
I. “JURY INSTRUCTIONS” 
[The purpose of c]ivil jury instructions [is] to inform jurors of the 
legal principles they must apply when deciding a case.192  
Instructions [can] inform jurors of their role in the trial process.193  
In addition, . . . instructions help jurors focus on their duties and 
responsibilities, the parties’ factual contentions, and the parties’ 
 
186.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra, note 150, at 97 (citing Joseph W. Cotchett, Commencement 
Address to the Hastings Class of 1999, HASTINGS COMMUNITY 11 (Winter 1999).  That jury 
acquitted six of the soldiers of murder and convicted two with a sentence to have their hands 
branded and then be set free.). 
187.  Id. (citing Hicks v. Mickelson, 835 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that 
“participation by counsel in voir dire process frequently results in undue expenditure of time in the 
jury selection process”)). 
188.  Id. (citing Hicks, 835 F.2d at 722 (allowing each party only fifteen minutes for voir dire 
examination of jury panel upheld, declaring that voir dire examination by the court is the most 
efficient and effective way to assure an impartial jury); ABA, supra note 154, § 1). 
189.  Id. (citing 1 O’MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE, supra note 11, § 4.07, at 129; see also 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 
2482, at 113 (1995) (stating that unfortunately, counsel too often regard voir dire as an 
opportunity to obtain a jury sympathetic to their position)); Hirsch et al., supra note 185, at 25 
(noting that “the biggest abuse of attorney voir dire is the attempt by attorneys to obtain a 
commitment from the jurors”). 
190.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra, note 150, at 97 (citing ABRAMSON, supra note 105, at 21.  
Abramson goes on to discuss a number of prominent cases in which the parties went to great effort 
to excluded jurors who had heard of the dispute.  Id. at 21-22.).   
191.  Id. at 97-98 (citing ABRAMSON, supra note 105, at 43). 
192.  Id. at 98.  
193.  Id. (citing David P. Bancroft, Jury Instructions, Communications, Juror Substitutions 
and Special/Partial Verdicts: Selected Topics-The Principal Law, in THE JURY 1987: 
TECHNIQUES FOR THE TRIAL LAWYER 611, 621 (1987)).  
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theories of the case.194  Instructions may be given before and 
during the evidence, as well at the close of evidence.195 
Jurors cannot be expected to render a proper verdict if the jury 
instructions are unintelligible.196  The trial judge must instruct the 
jurors fully and correctly on the applicable law of the case.  A 
party is entitled to a specific instruction on its theory of the case if 
there is evidence to support it, and if a proper request for the 
instruction has been made under Rule 51 [of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure].197 
The jury instructions must be written and organized so that the 
jurors will understand them.198  The instructions must guide, 
direct, and assist the jurors toward an intelligent understanding of 
the legal and factual issues involved in their search for truth.  
Although the judge must instruct the jury on the controlling issues, 
federal courts do not generally favor abstract charges.199 
Despite the importance of providing jurors with understandable 
jury instructions, numerous studies have discussed the extent to 
which jurors misunderstand the applicable law.200  The importance 
 
194.  Id. (citing Bancroft, supra note 193, at 621); Michael J. Farrell, Communications in the 
Courtroom: Jury Instructions, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 5, 21-27 (1982). 
195.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra, note 150, at 98. 
196.  Id. (citing MANUAL, supra note 154, § 22.431; 1 O’MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE, supra 
note 11, § 7, at 511 (offering an in-depth discussion of techniques for drafting understandable jury 
instructions).  See generally Christopher N. May, What Do We Do Now?: Helping Juries Apply 
the Instructions, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869 (1998); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Power and the 
Process: Instructions and the Civil Jury, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837 (1998)). 
197.  Id. (citing Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1485 (8th Cir. 1996).  Compare WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 185, § 2556 (providing that the trial judge must instruct the jury properly on 
controlling issues in case, even though there has been no request for an instruction or the 
requested instruction is defective), with Rivera v. Todo Bayamon, 174 F.R.D. 247, 249-50 (D.P.R. 
1997) (finding that the defendants’ failure to request instructions cautioning jury against making a 
prejudiced decision as result of the plaintiff’s panic attack at end of closing arguments did not 
make it inappropriate to grant new trial based on panic attack)). 
198.  Id. at 99 (citing Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., 274 F.2d 890, 897 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 
363 U.S. 812 (1960) (instructions ought to be stated in logical sequence and in the common 
speech . . . if they are to serve their traditional and constitutional purpose); ABA, supra note 154, 
§ 15 (stating that “instructions should be readily understood by lay persons of average education 
and sophistication”); see also Michael Higgins, Not So Plain English, 84 A.B.A. J. 40 (June 
1998)). 
199.  Id. (citing WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 185, § 2556). 
200.  Id. (citing Hope V. Samborn, Changing the Jury Tool Box, A.B.A. J. 22 (Dec. 1997) 
(citing studies); Peter M. Tiersma, Reforming the Language of Jury Instructions, 22 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 37, 46-52 (1993); Jamison Wilcox, The Craft of Drafting Plain-Language Jury Instructions: 
A Study of a Sample Pattern Instruction on Obscenity, 59 TEMP. L. Q. 1159, 1160-61 (1986); 
Christopher N. May, What We Do Now?: Helping Juries Apply the Instructions, 28 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 869, 872 n.14 (1995); see also Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 
1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948) (Frank, J.) (finding often the judge must state rules to 
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of understandable jury instructions has been stressed by Judge 
William Schwarzer: 
Prevailing practices of instructing juries are often so archaic and 
unrealistic that even in relatively simple cases what the jurors hear 
is little more than legal mumbo jumbo to them.  Responsibility for 
the shortcomings of present practices must be shared by lawyers, 
trial courts, and appellate courts—lawyers for submitting self-
serving, excessively long and argumentative instructions, trial 
judges for adhering to archaic practices out of fear of being 
reversed, and appellate courts for elevating legal abstractions over 
juror understanding.201 
Difficulties with jury instructions can be mitigated in a number of 
ways: 
(1) Jurors can be given pretrial instructions on the substantive 
law.202 
(2) Jurors can be given notebooks containing court’s preliminary 
instructions; selected admitted exhibits; parties’ stipulations; 
photographs of parties; witnesses; or exhibits; curricula vitae of 
experts; lists or seating charts identifying attorneys and clients; a 
short statement of the parties’ claims; lists or indices of admitted 
exhibits; glossaries; chronologies and timelines; and the court’s 
final instructions.203 
(3) Jury instructions can be repeated.204 
(4) Jurors can be allowed to take notes on the judge’s 
instructions.205 
 
jury with such niceties that many lawyers do not comprehend them, and it is impossible that jury 
can)). 
201.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra, note 150, at 99 (quoting William W. Schwarzer, 
Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CAL. L. REV. 731, 732 (1981)). 
202.  Id. at 100 (citing John C. Lowe, Making Complex Litigation Clear, 33 TRIAL 46, 48 
(1997) (instructing jurors after the parties finish presenting evidence is too late to help the jurors 
know what to look for as the evidence is presented)). 
203  Id. (citing ABA, supra note 154, § 3; e.g., Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., 72 F.3d 
1003, 1008 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Rana, 944 F.2d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
502 U.S. 1077 (1992); United States v. Plitt S. Theaters, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1095, 1096 (W.D.N.C. 
1987); see also MANUAL, supra note 154, §§ 22.32, 22.42); HOWARD ROSS CABOT & 
CHRISTOPHER S. COLEMAN, HEY, CALIFORNIA, LISTEN UP, CALIFORNIA LAWYER 23 (July 
1999)). 
204.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra, note 150, at 100. 
205.  Id. (citing Lowe, supra note 202, at 49 (stating that jurors should be permitted to take 
notes on court’s preliminary jury instructions); ABA, supra note 154, § 6; MANUAL, supra note 
154, § 22.42; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in Trials Through Note Taking and 
         
2017] THE CIVIL JURY IN THE UNITED STATES 387 
(5) Jurors can be given written copies of the jury instructions.206 
(6) Judges can be permitted to answer jurors’ questions about the 
instructions.207 
(7) Jury instructions can be written to simplify the language and 
increase jurors’ understanding of the law.208 
(8) The instructions should inform the jury of how the law applies 
to the particular case, instead of merely reciting the applicable 
statute.209 
(9) Instructions can be given before closing arguments, while the 
judge has the jurors’ attention and counsel can use the instructions 
in their closing arguments.210 
1. “Written Copies of Instructions for Jurors”211 
Jurors [could] be given written copies of their instructions, as long 
as the judge instructs the jury that they must consider the written 
instructions in their entirety.212 
 
Question Asking, supra note 164, at 261; J. Alexander. Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury 
Instructions, 69 NEB. L. REV. 71, 84-85 (1990)).  
206.  Id. (citing United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 451 U.S. 1018, and cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1981) (giving jury a copy of instructions is 
desirable in complex cases, but practice is within sound discretion of trial judge); United States v. 
Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884, 896 (7th Cir. 1963) (stating that, as litigation grows increasingly 
complex, jury often may be helped in deliberations by having copy of the instructions before it); 
Copeland v. United States, 152 F.2d 769, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (stating that it is frequently 
desirable for instructions that have been reduced to writing to be read and handed over to the 
jury); ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL CASES, xi (1990) (stating that the 
experience of increasing number of district judges in the submission of written instructions to jury 
has been good and practice is recommended); Lowe, supra note 202, at 49 (stating that jurors need 
instructions in writing to facilitate their deliberations); MANUAL, supra note 154, § 22.434 (stating 
that “[m]ost judges provide jurors with copies of the instructions for use during deliberations”); 
see also ABA, supra note 154, § 15.  But see MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 1, 16 (1998) (general instructions given at outset 
of trial should not be sent in writing to jury room).  See generally Propriety and Prejudicial Effect 
of Sending Written Instructions with Retiring Jury in Civil Case, 91 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 336 (1979); 
Sonja Larson, Taking and Use of Trial Notes by Jury, 36 A.L.R. Fed. 5th 255 (1996)). See, e.g., 
Doane v. Jacobson, 244 F.2d 710, 711 (1st Cir. 1957) (nothing in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
forbids submitting written copy of instructions to jury)). 
207.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 101. 
208.  Id. (citing ABA, supra note 154, § 15; CAROLYN G. ROBBINS, JURY INSTRUCTIONS: 
PLAINER IS BETTER, 32 TRIAL 32, (Apr. 1996); Tiersma, supra note 200, at 72-73; Wilcox, supra 
note 200, at 1161; cf. United States v. Russo, 110 F.3d 948, 953-54 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding, in 
criminal case, that the decision whether to submit written instructions to jury properly lies within 
the discretion of the district court)). 
209.  Id. 
210.  Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 51 advisory committee’s notes to 1987 amendment). 
211.  Id.  
212  Id. (citing ABA, supra note 154, § 9; Douglas G. Smith, supra note 7, at 476-77; Haupt 
v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 643 (1947) (holding that submitting a copy of the charge to the 
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Judges follow different practices with respect to jury 
instructions.213  Some judges send a full set of written instructions 
into the jury room after they have been read in open court.214  
Other judges also provide jurors with written copies of the 
instructions to follow as they listen to the judge give the 
instructions.215  [In addition, s]ome courts have experimented by 
providing jurors with a tape recording of their instructions for use 
during deliberations.216 
The Ninth Circuit has approved the practice of providing written 
copies of instructions.217  [While condemning the practice, the 
Fifth Circuit will find no error absent prejudice] in providing 
jurors with written copies of the instructions. . . .218  [And, t]he 
Eleventh Circuit has approved sending a tape-recorded copy of the 
charge into the jury room.219 
2. “Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”220 
Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure describes the 
methods for requesting, giving, and objecting to jury instructions 
 
jury did not constitute “unfairness or irregularity”); see Hopt v. People, 104 U.S. 631 (1881) 
(suggesting the approval of a Utah statute requiring the charge to be reduced to writing); see also 
KASSIN & LAWRENCE, supra note 157, at 146-47 (describing studies showing that jurors who had 
access to written material understood the legal terms and substantive law better than those not 
provided with that material); Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, supra note 157, at 585-87 
(availability of charge in jury room is almost always certain to assist jury in arriving at an 
informed verdict while reducing need to send questions to the judge and have parts of the charge 
reread).  Compare United States v. McCall, 592 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 441 U.S. 
936 (1979) (approving the practice of providing written copies of instructions), with United States 
v. Perez, 648 F.2d 219, 222 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 970 (1981) (condemning the practice 
of providing written copies of instructions while finding no error absent prejudice in providing the 
jurors with written copies of instructions)). 
213.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 102. 
214.  Id. (citing 8TH CIR. CIVIL JURY INSTR. XI (1998)). 
215.  Id.; 1 O’MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE, supra note 11, § 7:6; see Schwarzer, Reforming Jury 
Trials, supra note 157 at, 584-85. 
216.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 102 (citing MANUAL, supra note 154, § 22.434, 
at 153 n.427); see United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1384-86 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
217.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 102 (citing McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525, 
1530 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. McKenzie v. McCormick, 488 U.S. 901 
(1988)). 
218.  Id. (citing United States v. Perez, 648 F.2d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 1055 (1981)). 
219.  Id. (citing United States v. Henes, 729 F.2d 1302, 1316 n. 13 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied sub nom. Caldwell v. United States, 469 U.S. 1110 (1985); United States v. Watson, 669 
F.2d 1374, 1384-86 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
220.  Id. 
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in civil actions.221  The trial judge must instruct the jury properly 
on the controlling issues in the case, even though there has been no 
request for an instruction or the requested instruction is 
defective.222 
Rule 51 provides as follows: 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial 
as the court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests 
that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the 
requests.  The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action 
upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury.  The court, 
at its election, may instruct the jury before or after argument or 
both.  No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give 
an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury 
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected 
to and the grounds of the objection.  Opportunity shall be given to 
make the objection out of the hearing of the jury.223 
The particular form of a jury instruction generally is within the 
trial court’s discretion.224  No [particular] form [need be used] so 
long as the charge as a whole conveys [to the jury] a clear and 
correct understanding of the applicable law225 without confusing or 
misleading the jury.226 
Care should be taken to ensure that instructions correctly state the law in a 
form that will be understandable to the jury.227 
The court should direct counsel to submit proposed instructions at 
the final pretrial conference.228  Before delivering any instructions 
 
221.  Id. (citing WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 185, §§ 2551-58; 4 MARY B. COOK & JAY E. 
GRENIG, supra note 173, §§ 4221-4260); 3B JAY E. GRENIG, WEST’S FEDERAL FORMS—
DISTRICT COURTS CIVIL ch. 34 (2016). 
222.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 102; 3B JAY E. GRENIG, WEST’S FEDERAL 
FORMS—DISTRICT COURTS CIVIL § 34:6 (2016). 
223.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 102 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 51).  
224.  Id. (citing Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 419-
20 (2d Cir. 1999); Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grwinner Oil, Inc., 125 F.3d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 
1997); Gillming v. Simmons Indus., 91 F.3d 1168, 1171-72 (8th Cir. 1996); Sengoku Works, Ltd. 
v. RMC Int’l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1103 (1997); 
Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
519 U.S. 911 (1996)). 
225.  Id. (citing Image Tech. Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1213 (9th 
Cir. 1997); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1543 (11th Cir. 1996)). 
226.  Id. at 102-03 (citing Image Tech. Services, Inc., 125 F.3d at 1213; Toroise v. 
Community Bank of Homestead, 116 F.3d 860, 868 (11th Cir. 1997); U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California, Guidelines for Preparation of jury Instructions (instructions must 
be written and organized so they will be understood by jurors)). 
227.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 106. 
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to the jury, the judge should inform counsel of the content of the 
instructions the judge intends to deliver. . . . [Counsel should be 
provided with a copy of the instructions, permitted to argue] the 
proposed instructions, [and] make a record of any objections.229  
Where counsel cannot agree on instructions, . . . each party [should 
be required] to submit proposed instructions and objections to the 
opponent’s instructions.230 
3. “Crafting Jury Instructions”231 
The jury should be instructed “on every material issue.232  Although the 
instructions need not be phrased in terms of the specific facts of the 
particular case, . . . courts have shown a preference for instructions that 
relate the law to the evidence presented by the parties.”233  Substantive 
instructions should be tailored to the case, avoiding “generalized pattern 
instructions.”234  “Instructions phrased in the language of appellate opinions 
should be explained with reference to the facts and parties in the case.”235  
“[I]t may be helpful to use illustrations familiar to the jurors.”236 
In drafting jury instructions, the following should be considered: 
(1) Instructions should be accurate statements of the law. 
(2) Instructions should be as brief and concise as practicable. 
(3) The average [high school student] should be able to understand 
the instructions.237 
(4) Each instruction should be objective and free of argument. 
(5) Whenever possible, instructions should use the parties’ names 
rather than legal terms, such as plaintiff, defendant, bailee, 
licensor, assignee, or franchisee. 
(6) The use of technical or obscure legal phrases should be 
avoided.238 
 
228.  Id. at 103 (citing MANUAL, supra note 154, § 22.431). 
229.  Id. (citing ABA, supra note 154, § 15). 
230.  Id. (citing ABA, supra note 154, § 15). 
231.  Id. 
232.  Id. (citing Gillentine v. McKeanad, 426 F.2d 717, 724 n. 24 (1st Cir. 1970)). 
233.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 103-04 (citing Turlington v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 795 F.2d 434, 443 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
234.  Id. at 104 (citing MANUAL, supra note 154, § 22.431). 
235.  Id. (citing MANUAL, supra note 154, § 22.431). 
236.  Id. (citing MANUAL, supra note 154, § 22.431). 
237.  Id. (citing ABA, supra note 154, § 15(e)(i)). 
238.  Id. (citing WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 185, § 2556; Nelson v. Green Ford, Inc., 788 
F.2d 205, 209 (4th Cir. 1986); Hagelthorn v. Kenncott Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 85 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
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(7) The instructions should be arranged and delivered in a logical 
and coherent fashion.239 
(8) Jurors should not receive instructions on issues they do not 
need to decide.240 
It is insufficient for an instruction to merely repeat statutory 
language unless the meaning and application of the statutory 
language to the facts are clear without any explanation.241  
Additionally, taking quotations from appellate court opinions that 
were never intended to be used as jury instructions and making 
these part of the instructions is generally not helpful.242  One court 
has explained: 
It has always been the law governing jury trials in federal courts 
that “no court is bound to give instructions in the form and 
language in which they are asked.  If those given sufficiently cover 
the case and are correct, the judgment will not be disturbed, 
whatever those may have been which were refused.” . . . Indeed, 
we know as a practical matter that most requested instructions are 
colored with the advocate’s view of his client’s cause, and cannot 
fairly be given in the requested language. . . . “Once the judge has 
made an accurate and correct charge, the extent of its 
amplifications must rest largely in his discretion.” 
But even so, jury trials in federal courts are conducted as at 
common law when the Constitution was adopted, under which the 
judge is the governor of the trial with the inescapable duty to fully 
and correctly instruct the jury on the applicable law of the case, 
and to guide, direct and assist them toward an intelligent 
understanding of the legal and factual issues involved in their 
search for the truth. . . . This duty is not fulfilled by mere abstract 
statements of the factual issues and the law applicable thereto.  
The instructions ought to be stated in logical sequence and in the 
 
239.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 104 (citing Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Jones, 298 F.2d 
188, 191 (5th Cir. 1962)). 
240.  Id. 
241.  Id. (citing WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 185, § 2556; Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. 
Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 723 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
242.  Id. at 104-05 (citing Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463, 468 n. 1 (10th Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 898 (1992); Turlington v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 795 F.2d 434, 444 
(5th Cir. 1986); Kent v. Smith, 404 F.2d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 1968)); Justice v. Dennis, 793 F.2d 
573, 576 (4th Cir. 1986). 
         
392 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92: 365 
common speech of man if they are to serve their traditional and 
constitutional purpose in our system of jurisprudence.243 
“Local rules should be consulted with respect to the required format for 
instructions.”244  “For example, [proposed jury instructions should comply 
with] the following requirements”: 
(1) The instructions “must be in plain language, concise, and free of 
argument.”245  (2) Each instruction should “cover only one subject that shall 
be indicated on a caption.”246  (3) Each instruction should “disclose the 
identity of the submitting party.”247  (4) Each instruction should “state each 
instruction on a separate page.”248  (5) Each instruction should “set forth 
any citations to authorities supporting it.”249  (6) “Pages must be 
consecutively numbered.”250 
4. “Using Model Instructions” 
Model jury instructions can be helpful in preparing the charg[ing 
documents.]251  [However, jury instructions should not be used as] 
a substitute for the individual research and drafting that may be 
required in a particular case.252  Adaptation or modification may 
be necessary to fit a particular case or changing laws.253 
Very few pattern instructions are intended to be copied 
verbatim. . . . [Instead, t]hey are principally intended as an aid to 
the preparation of an appropriate instruction in the particular case.  
What is sauce for the goose is not always sauce for the gander.  
Each case has its own peculiar facts, and formalized instructions 
must be tailored to the facts and issues.254 
In drafting pattern instructions, the committees have attempted “to use 
simple, commonplace words while accurately stating the law.”255  
 
243.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 105 (citing Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., 274 F.2d 890, 
897 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 812 (1960) (citations omitted)). 
244.  Id. (quoting N.D. Cal. R. 245-3). 
245.  Id. (quoting N.D. Cal. R. 245-3). 
246.  Id. (quoting N.D. Cal. R. 245-3). 
247.  Id. (quoting N.D. Cal. R. 245-3). 
248.  Id. (quoting N.D. Cal. R. 245-3). 
249.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 105 (quoting N.D. Cal. R. 245-3). 
250.  Id. (quoting N.D. Cal. R. 245-3). 
251.  Id. at 106. 
252.  Id. 
253.  Id. (citing Bancroft, supra note 193, at 621). 
254.  Id. (citing Edward J. DEVITT, TEN PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS ABOUT FEDERAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, 38 F. R. D. 75, 77 (D. Colo. 1965)). 
255.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 106.  
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Unnecessary words have not been used.  “The instructions generally use 
short sentences and try to avoid negative forms.”256  “Where appropriate, 
definitions of terms used” are given.257 
Because language that is meaningful to those with a legal 
education is often lost upon others, [the] verbatim adoption of 
language from appellate opinions to formulate instructions should 
generally be avoided.  Every attempt should be made to craft the 
instructions in language [non-lawyers] will readily comprehend.  
Short sentences and the active voice should be used wherever 
possible; unnecessary words or phrases should be omitted.258 
5. “Instructions at the Beginning, During, and at the Conclusion 
of Trial”259 
Developments during the trial may create the need for additional 
instructions.  A judge should consider giving instructions at any 
point in the trial where they might be helpful to the jury. . . .260  
These instructions may include an explanation of applicable legal 
principles that may be helpful when given at the time the issue 
arises and instructions limiting the purpose for which evidence is 
admitted.261 
Final instructions are generally submitted to the court in 
connection with the final pretrial conference, [and may be given] 
before or after closing arguments, or [both].262  Most judges 
provide jurors with copies of the instructions for use during 
deliberations.263  Some judges record the oral charge and send the 
tape into the jury room for reference.264 
IV. CONCLUSION 
During the 1970s, attacks on the civil jury became 
commonplace.265  [F]ormer Chief Justice Warren Burger 
 
256.  Id. 
257.  Id. 
258.  Id. 
259.  Id. 
260.  Id. (citing MANUAL, supra note 154, § 22.433, at 152) (referencing the importance in 
using interim instructions to focus jury on what it must decide and how decisions are reached)). 
261.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 106-07 (citing MANUAL, supra note 154, § 
22.433, at 152). 
262.  Id. at 107 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 51(a)). 
263.  Id. (citing MANUAL, supra note 154, § 22.434, at 153). 
264.  Id. (citing MANUAL, supra note 154, § 22.434, at 154). 
265.  Id. (citing GUINTHER, supra note 6, at xiv). 
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[expressed] “doubts about the capabilities of juries.”266  He urged 
that there be stringent limitations in the access to our courts and to 
juries.267  More recently, arbitration clauses imposed by credit card 
companies, health care providers, and investment advisors have 
also limited access to trial by jury.268 
While the jury system may not be the essence of efficiency, there 
does not appear to be a more satisfactory alternative.  The jury 
system is a cornerstone of American freedom and an important 
safeguard to a free society.269  [It] is a direct consequence of the 
sovereignty of the people and a bulwark of protection for the 
individual.270  The jury is an essential part of Abraham Lincoln’s 
“government of the people, by the people, for the people.”271  Not 
only is a trial before a jury of one’s peers [a primary technique] for 
finding the truth [in our democracy],272 the jury also serves to 
communicate the spirit of the law to the minds of all the citizens 
and the spirit of the people to the governors.273 
The importance of the jury system has been aptly summarized by G.K. 
Chesterton:274 
Our [civilization] has decided, and very justly decided that 
determining the guilt or innocence of men is a thing too important 
 
266.  Id. (quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156-57 (citing JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 
(1949) (describing juries as the premier example of irrationality in the law)); see WARREN C. 
BURGER, TESTIMONIAL DINNER FOR SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE BELL (Nov. 14, 1970); 
ROSS, supra note 34, at 5; see also GUINTHER, supra note 6, at xiv.  
267.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 107 (citing GUINTHER, supra note 6, at xiv); 
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156-57. 
268.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 107 (citing JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION §§ 10.41, 15.50, 15.72, 16.10-16.15 (2d ed. 1997).  Compare Badie v. Bank 
of America, 79 Cal.Rptr. 273 (1998) (failure of bank customers to close or stop using credit 
accounts immediately after receiving “bill stuffer” containing arbitration provision did not waive 
right to jury trial), with Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that 
contract terms shipped with a computer in box are binding on a customer if not returned within the 
allowed time)). 
269.  Id. at 107-08 (citing National Health to Usurp No-Fault?, 7 TRIAL 53 (Mar./Apr. 1971) 
(quoting retired Justice Tom C. Clark) [hereinafter Clark]). 
270.  Id. at 108 (citing ROSS, supra note 34, at 18; National Health to Usurp No-Fault?, 7 
TRIAL 53 (Mar./Apr. 1971)). 
271.  Id. (quoting Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at 
Gettysburg, (Nov. 19, 1863), http://www.d.umn.edu/~rmaclin/gettysburg-address.html)). 
272.  Id. (citing Irving R. Kaufman, A Fair Jury—The Essence of Justice, 51 JUDICATURE 
88, 92 (1967)). 
273.  Id. (citing ROSS, supra note 34, at 18). 
274.  A noted English writer, poet, philosopher, dramatist, journalist, orator, lay theologian, 
biographer, and literary and art critic.  See Dale Ahlquist, Who is this Guy and Why Haven’t I 
Heard of Him?, THE AMERICAN CHESTERTON SOCIETY, http://www.chesterton.org/who-is-this-
guy/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2107).   
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to be trusted to trained men.  If it wishes for light upon that awful 
matter, it asks men who know no more law then I know, but who 
can feel the things I felt in a jury box.  When it wants a library 
catalogued, or the solar system discovered, or any trifle of that 
kind, it uses up its specialists.  But when it wishes anything done 
that is really serious, it collects twelve of the ordinary men 
standing about.  The same thing was done, if I remember right, by 
the Founder of Christianity.275 
Juries may not always get it “right,” but the right to a jury trial is a 
central part of our system of self-government.  Maintenance of the 
jury is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our 
history and jurisprudence, any curtailment of the right to a jury 
trial should be scrutinized with extreme care.276 
 
 
275.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 108 (quoting Gilbert K. Chesterton, The Twelve 
Men, DAILY NEWS (London), reprinted in TREMENDOUS TRIFLES 86-87 (1909)).  This document 
is available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/8092/8092-h/8092-h.htm. 
276.  Grenig’s Civil Jury, supra note 150, at 108 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 
486 (1935)). 
